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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on Chinese mutual fund 
performance and market share. We focus on two dimensions of ownership structure, 
namely the background of the owners and the degree of ownership concentration. Using 
a hand-collected dataset comprising 731 observations for 94 fund management 
companies over the period from 2005 to 2015, we provide evidence with panel 
estimation shows that the government ownership ratio and government-controlled 
companies have a positive effect on funds’ performance. On the other hand, foreign 
ownership has a negative impact on performance and market share. Having a higher 
ownership concentration is more likely to increase the company’s market share, 
whereas government-controlled companies experience a negative impact on their 
market share.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the past three decades, China’s capital market has experienced rapid growth and 
has become the second largest in the world, moving from a predominantly centrally 
planned economy towards a market-oriented economy. In order to promote the stock 
exchange, and market related activism and oversight, the Chinese authorities has 
fostered the presence of institutional investors (Jiang and Kim 2015), especially in the 
case of mutual funds. The number of mutual funds has increased significantly since the 
first mutual fund was founded in China, in September 2001. The total net value of 
mutual funds increased from 470 to 1797 billion Chinese yuan from 2005 to 2007 
(Yuan et al. 2008). Up to 2015, the total net value had soared to 8.4 trillions Chinese 
yuan (based on our data). This paper comes in a timely manner as it draws information 
from hand-collected data on Chinese mutual funds to explore the underlying 
relationships between funds’ performance and ownership structure. There are some 
studies that review China’s legal and financial system, especially with regard to 
corporate governance, investor protection and financial stability in general (Allen et al. 
2008), though to date there is no evidence for mutual funds despite their prominent 
importance, if anything, due to their significant growth in recent years but also due to 
changes in the regulatory environment and the structure of this financial industry. Our 
paper covers this gap.  
 
Moreover, some regulation reforms have been implemented through the years. The 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)3 made a strategic decision to permit 
the rules of establishment of joint venture fund management companies in 2002 in order 
to improve corporate governance and financial transparency in the mutual fund industry. 
These changes have allowed foreign institutions to invest in fund management 
companies which are controlled by government agencies. In light of this, the number 
of fund management companies with foreign investor has increased significantly to 46 
at the end of 2015, accounting for almost half of fund management companies in the 
market. Such changes lead to changes in the ownership structure as government 
 
3 The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the main regulator of the securities industry 
in China and its operations are similar in its charge to the SEC in the United State. 
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ownership is being transferred to foreign investors. This raises an interesting question 
on whether different types of ownership would affect fund’s performance, as having 
different types of owners could lead to different investment behaviors.  
 
To date, the literature on corporate governance is largely focused on banks (Becker-
Blease and Irani 2008; Brown and Caylor 2009; Boateng et al. 2017) whilst there are 
some studies on funds’ performance (Gong et al. 2016; Ferris and Yan 2009). For China 
Gong et al. (2016) is one of the very few studies that examine the impact of 
organizational structure on funds’ performance. Our study builds and extends on Gong 
et al. (2016) by investigating the impact of ownership structure on funds’ performance 
and market share. We argue that funds’ market share represents the culmination of all 
the decisions made by the fund management company and the investors’ response to 
those decisions, in line with the seminal paper of Khorana and Servaes (2012). 
 
To analyze the impact of ownership type on company performance and market share, 
we follow previous studies (Iannotta et al. 2007; Boubakri et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2017) 
and focus on two dimensions of a mutual fund management company’s ownership. 
Firstly, we look at the background of the owners, which in this case is either the 
government or foreign investors. This distinction in ownership structure is of 
importance and has been rarely being studied though it would provide significant 
information regarding heterogeneity across fund management companies. For example, 
the background of the owners, two companies with the same degree of ownership 
concentration may differ in performance if one of them has a high government 
ownership. Secondly, we examine the degree of ownership concentration, as companies 
may differ because their ownership is more or less dispersed (Iannotta et al. 2007). In 
line with recent fund performance studies (Kong and Tang 2008; Cremers et al. 2009; 
Gong et al. 2016), we use the funds’ raw return and abnormal return to represent its 
performance. In addition, we follow the study by Khorana and Servaes (2012) and 
include in our analysis the market share.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the literature on ownership 
structure regarding to mutual fund management companies in developing countries, and 
in particular China, is limited and some related studies have largely focused on the 
banking sector and non-financial firms. We argue herein that mutual fund management 
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companies differ in many respects from banks and thereby one should provide 
modelling for the former. Such modeling should take into account regulations, the 
multitude of stakeholders and the complex management structure. Also, it is extremely 
difficult to collect information and thereby data for Chinese fund management 
companies, other than hand-collected data as it does the present study. Thus, we 
manually assemble a unique dataset of Chinese fund management companies that 
identify ownership structure in the form of government ownership, foreign ownership 
and ownership concentration from 2005 and 2015. This data set provides unique 
information for studying the effect of ownership structure on funds’ performance, as 
none of its mutual fund management companies are publicly traded companies. Third, 
we consider whether the impact of foreign ownership on funds’ return and market share 
is changed by the extent of government control, as Chen et al (2017) present that the 
impact of foreign ownership is influenced by the extent of government control. 
Therefore, we employ the interactions between foreign ownership and government 
ownership 4 . Lastly, we extend the literature by using different fund management 
company-specific variables5 and employ the two-step ‘system’ dynamic generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimations to address the issue of endogeneity which has 
been frequently quoted as an issue in similar studies. 
 
Our findings show that government ownership asserts a positive effect on a mutual 
funds’ performance. Alas, foreign ownership is not only linked to lower funds’ 
performance, but also tends to reduce a fund management company’s market share. 
Government-controlled fund management companies are negatively associated with 
their market share, whereas performance and market share are positively correlated 
with government ownership in highly concentrated in terms of ownership. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews studies on the corporate 
governance of mutual fund management companies and also discusses the development 
of the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the methodology and data used. Section 4 presents 
 
4 We also consider the interactions between ownership concentration and foreign ownership and the 
interactions between ownership concentration and government ownership.  
5  Following recent studies, we summarize the attributes of mutual funds and fund management 
companies for comparison purposes in Appendix Table A3. 
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the results of the empirical study and offers some discussion. The final section 
summarizes key findings and suggests policy implications.  
2 Related literature and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Ownership types and fund performance  
 
Over the past decade, the corporate governance of mutual fund has achieved 
prominence both in relation to the developed and emerging markets (see, e.g. Tufano 
and Sevick 1997; Del et al. 2003; Kong and Tang 2008; Adams et al. 2010; Ding et al. 
2010; Fu and Wedge 2011; Calluzzo and Dong 2014; Adams et al. 2018; Kurniawan et 
al. 2016). However, only few studies examine the relationship between ownership 
structure and mutual funds’ performance where the focus is on the developed markets. 
Table 1 shows several recent empirical studies that investigate the impact of ownership 
structure on funds’ performance (Berkowitz and Qiu 2003; Shinozawa 2007; Ferris and 
Yan 2009; Shinozawa 2010; Gong et al. 2016).6 Berkowitz and Qiu (2003) examine the 
impact of the type of ownership of mutual fund on their performance and risk-taking 
behavior, and document that publicly-traded management companies do not perform 
better than private management companies. Gong et al. (2016) focus on the 
organizational structures of Chinese fund management companies and find that if the 
top1 shareholder has a larger stake in the company, this is positively correlated with an 
affiliated fund performance. However, having multiple large shareholders in a fund 
management company reduces fund performance. 
 
Table 1 Recent studies on the relationship between ownership structure and fund 
performance 
References Countries   Years in sample Ownership 
structure 
Methodology 
 
Gong et al. 
(2016) 
 
China 
 
2004 - 2009 
 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
FGLS regressions 
 
Shinozawa 
(2010) 
United Kingdom 
 
1999 - 2001 
 
Mutual vs 
Proprietary 
 
Tobit regressions 
 
Ferris and Yan 
(2009) 
 
United States 1992 - 2004 
 
Public vs Private 
fund families 
 
Cross - sectional 
regressions 
 
Shinozawa 
(2007) 
United Kingdom 2000 - 2005 
 
Mutual vs Public 
companies 
Time series 
 
 
6 The terms ‘fund management company’ and ‘fund family’ are interchangeable.  
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Berkowitz and 
Qiu (2003) 
Canadian 1985 - 1998 
 
Public vs Private 
management 
companies 
Cross - sectional 
regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
 
2.2.1 Government ownership  
 
Previous empirical studies note that government ownership plays an important role in 
influencing firm performance but present mixed results in the Chinese context. On the 
one hand, firms with high level of government ownership weakens the corporate 
governance mechanisms, because managers of these firms are not subject to market 
pressures such as those found in financial, goods, and labour markets (Chen et al. 2017). 
Chen et al. (2006) find that government ownership is positive associated with corporate 
fraud although only in relation to the univariate analysis. Fan et al. (2007) claim that 
state-controlled companies with politically connected CEOs have worse performance 
than companies without politically connected CEOs. In addition, they state that 
companies with politically connected CEOs prefer to appoint current or former 
government bureaucrats who often lack professionalism. In support of this argument, 
Ferri (2009) reports that city commercial banks perform better than state-controlled 
commercial banks with respect to non-performing loans. Similarly, Lin and Zhang 
(2009) observe there is a negative relationship between the ownership of the Big Four 
state-owned banks and long-term performance. Recently, Liang et al. (2013) found that 
a high level of political involvement in banks has a negative relationship with bank 
performance and asset quality using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks from 2003 to 
2010. Additionally, Fan et al. (2013) claim that companies with a higher degree of 
government ownership tend to perform relatively poorly in China, especially in the case 
of distressed companies. 
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On the other hand, to some extent, it is possible to observe the benefits of government-
controlled companies as high level of government ownership results in effective 
monitoring on corporate governance and improved financial transparency, because 
governments have a monopoly on the use of coercive power. Sun et al. (2002) find that 
government ownership has a positive association with company’s performance in 
China. They also point out that too little government ownership may not be good for 
firm performance. Moreover, Lin et al. (2016) indicate a positive relationship between 
government ownership of banks and cost efficiency in 12 Asian countries with more 
financial freedom. 
 
Regarding studies in western countries, Berger et al. (2005) find the most robust results 
that state-owned banks are inefficient and perform poorly in the long-term using data 
from Argentina. Borisova et al. (2012) suggest that state ownership of firms generally 
has a detrimental effect on the quality of corporate governance, as their objective is not 
to maximize the firm’s value. They also conclude that government intervention is 
harmful to the quality of corporate governance in civil law countries, but it is beneficial 
to the quality of corporate governance in common law countries. In addition, Ben-Nasr 
(2016) claims that state-controlled companies with a low level of net working capital 
experience a smaller increase in net working capital than those of non-government-
controlled companies by using a multinational sample of privatized firms from 54 
countries. More recently, Chen et al. (2017) document a strong and robust result that 
government ownership decreases investment efficiency as measured by investment-Q 
sensitivity on privatized firms from 64 countries. 
 
However, Borisova et al. (2015) discuss the impact of government ownership on the 
cost of debt under different circumstances in publicly traded firms from 43 countries. 
They find that government ownership is positively correlated with cost of debt in non-
crisis periods. However, during times of economic or firm distress, state ownership is 
associated with a lower cost of debt, as state owned firms have relatively easier access 
to bank credit from the government dominated banking system (Chahrumilind et al. 
2006; Faccio et al. 2006; Chaney et al. 2011; Hossain et al. 2013).  
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According to the above, it is clear that no consensus exists on the relationship between 
government ownership and funds’ performance and market share. Hence, we propose 
the following null hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: government ownership would impact upon performance and market 
share. 
 
2.2.2 Foreign ownership and funds’ performance 
 
Based on corporate governance literature, in general, foreign ownership is positively 
associated with the quality of corporate governance (Djankov and Murrell 2002; Gillan 
and Starks 2003). In the case of emerging financial markets, the entry of foreign 
institutional investors enhances human capital, skills and knowledge transfer. Levine 
(1996) claims that foreign participation in emerging countries’ financial market may 
provide high quality financial services and exert downward pressure on the prices of 
financial services. In support of this view, Sufian (2009) suggests that foreign-
controlled banks perform more efficiently than their domestically controlled 
counterparts, with reference to the Malaysian banking sector. In addition, foreign-
controlled banks have a relatively higher ownership concentration compared with 
domestic banks, so they are less prone to agency problems between shareholders and 
management teams. Li et al. (2011) find a negative correlation between foreign 
ownership and stock return volatility in 31 emerging stock markets and the results are 
robust even after controlling for potential endogeneity. 
 
By the contrast, Chen et al. (2013) find that foreign institutional ownership has a 
positive impact on firm-level stock return volatility in China using a sample of 1458 
firms from 1998 to 2008. Chen et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and innovation and find a negative correlation between foreign 
ownership and firm innovation as measured by technological diversity strategies using 
panel data from 138 Taiwanese firms. However, Huang and Zhu (2015) indicate that 
foreign institutional investors have a greater impact on firms’ corporate governance 
than local mutual funds (domestic institutional investors) and provide effective 
monitoring of on firms’ operations in Chinese equity market. Lin and Fu (2017) 
conclude that foreign investors have a larger influence on public firm performance than 
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domestic investors and point out that institutional investors improve shareholder value 
by attracting more analysts in China’s stock markets using a generalized method of 
moments estimator. Moreover, Singla et al. (2017) point out that foreign investors 
improve the market share of a local company, as they demonstrate that foreign 
institutions have a positive impact on internationalization in a sample of Indian firms. 
 
Consistent with the findings for emerging countries, Ferreira and Matos (2008) claim 
that firms with a higher level of foreign ownership have a higher quality of governance 
from 27 countries, for example they have higher firm valuations, a better operating 
performance and lower capital expenditures. Aggarwal et al. (2011) also state that 
foreign ownership has a positive impact on a firm’s corporate governance, particularly 
in the case of for non-U.S. firms. In their contemporaneous work, Chen et al. (2017) 
document that firms with foreign ownership tend to improve their investment efficiency 
especially in countries with poor national governance institutions. In addition, Bena et 
al. (2017) state that foreign ownership not only results in an increase in innovative 
output, but also improves a firm ‘s operations and firm valuation based on firm level 
data from 30 countries during the period from 2001 to 2010.  
 
Previous literature postulates that an increase in foreign ownership would positively 
affect company performance. Thus, the second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: foreign ownership would assert a positive impact on funds’ performance 
and market share. 
 
2.2.3 Ownership concentration  
 
Turning to the ownership concentration, Iannotta et al. (2007) highlight the importance 
of ownership dispersion for performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that there 
might issues between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, possible 
conflicts of interest that could constitute agency problem. In general, a high ownership 
concentration is beneficial for large shareholders and might damage the financial 
performance of the firm, as large shareholders seek to reap benefits of control at the 
expense of outside or minority shareholders (Goergen 2014). In addition, ownership 
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concentration is related to the separation of ownership from management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) that could also raise concerns of possible conflicts. 
 
Leech and Leahy (1991) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) find that ownership 
concentration negatively affects firm profitability. Jameson et al. (2014) also document 
that controlling shareholders’ board membership in Indian firms negatively affects the 
performance of these firms. Li et al. (2015) find a similar outcome and point out that a 
high ownership concentration reduces board effectiveness and decreases the level of 
internal monitoring of company management in Chinese publicly listed firms. Abdallah 
and Ismail (2017) further suggest that concentrated ownership leads to less efficient 
operation in public companies in the Gulf Cooperative Council region. However, 
Iannotta et al. (2007) argue that ownership concentration has insignificant impact on 
the performance of banks using a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European 
countries.  
 
On the other hand, high concentration in ownership may have positive effects on firm 
value due to the additional monitoring imposed on firms by large shareholders to 
mitigate principal–agent problems associated with dispersed ownership. As a 
consequence, highly concentrated ownership results in better firm performance and 
profitability. This finding is supported by Kaplan and Minton (1994); Hartzell and 
Starks (2003) and Maury (2006). Dong et al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion with 
regard to the Chinese banking sector and indicate that firms with concentrated 
ownership have improved monitoring of their management and promotes prudent 
operating procedures.  
 
Furthermore, Nguyen et al. (2015) point out that highly concentrated ownership 
enhances the quality of corporate governance, thereby improving the performance of 
firms. In addition, they state that this positive effect is stronger in a less developed 
governance system (Vietnam) than in a well-developed governance system (Singapore). 
Recently, Dong et al. (2017) found that having a higher ownership concentration has 
an incremental effect on board characteristics and efficiency in the Chinese banking 
sector from 2003 to 2011. In addition, Gong et al. (2016) claim that concentrated 
ownership tends to improve the performance of funds, as they find if a top1 shareholder 
holds a larger stake in a company, it has a positive impact on fund performance, and 
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they also find that the presence of multiple large shareholders decreases fund 
performance using a governance data covering Chinese mutual funds. Based on the 
above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: an increase in ownership concentration would positive affect the funds’ 
performance and market share. 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
 
The main source of mutual fund data is the China Securities Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database (also known as the Guo Tai An (GTA) database). This 
database has been widely used in prior studies (Zhang and Ding 2006; Yuan et al. 2008; 
Ding et al. 2010; Feng and Johansson 2015; Chizema et al. 2019; Koutmos et al. 2020). 
The CSMAR database is a leading global provider of Chinese data and produces seven 
major database series, including: stock market; corporate; bonds; funds; industry; and 
economy. Information is available both at the fund management company level and at 
the individual fund level. The sample period is from 2005 to 2015 and includes funds 
in all investment categories. The year 2005 has been chosen as the commencement year 
in this paper because open-ended funds were only introduced in 2001, and there is a 
lack of comprehensive data prior to 2005. In addition, the CSMAR database describes 
several classifications of investment objectives for each fund. Also, data about the fund 
management companies’ ownership structure have been manually collected from each 
fund management company’ website.  
 
Furthermore, a number of mutual funds contain several share classes, especially in the 
case of money market mutual funds and bond market mutual funds, and the CSMAR 
database separates each share class into individual funds. However, these individual 
funds represent claims on the identical underlying assets and have the same returns 
before expenses and loads. The only difference lies in their fee structure or in their 
clientele. In this paper, we aggregate these multiple share classes into one fund. The 
fund characteristics are calculated based on the TNA-weighted average.  
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3.1.1 Performance and market share 
 
We construct two measures of mutual funds’ performance using their returns from the 
CSMAR database. The first measure is the funds’ return which is calculated by the 
weighted average of returns across all funds within the same management company 
(Kong and Tang 2008; Cremers et al. 2009). The second measure is the abnormal return 
which is the difference between the funds’ return and market return.7 The second 
method serves as a robustness check. Following the previous study by Khorana and 
Servaes (2012), market share is calculated by adding together all the assets managed 
by each fund management company and then dividing this figure by the total managed 
assets in the open-ended mutual fund industry.  
 
3.1.2 Ownership structure 
In line with previous studies, we consider that ownership structure for the following 
categories: government ownership ratio (GO), government-controlled companies 
(GCCs), foreign ownership ratio (FO) and foreign invested companies (FICs). 
Government ownership is the percentage of shares owned by a government agency 
(Chen et al. 2006; Liang et al. 2013; Fan et al. 2013; Lin et al. 2016). A government-
controlled company is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is 
a government agency and 0 otherwise (Fan et al. 2007; Kwak et al. 2009; Zhang, 2009; 
Liu et al. 2019). Foreign ownership is the percentage of shares owned by foreign 
investors (Ferreira and Motas, 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2013; Chen et 
al. 2016; Lin and Fu, 2017; Singla et al. 2017). A foreign-invested company is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investors and 0 
otherwise. Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the ownership structure and 
ownership changes over time. The sample mean of state ownership in Panel A of Table 
2 is 54.54 percent, which is greater than that of 27.3 percent found in Dong et al (2014)8 
and 23.89 percent calculated by Chen et al (2017).9 Moreover, our sample mean of 70 
percent for state–controlled companies is comparable to that of Dong et al. (2014). 
 
7 The market return is calculated by 30% of the Shanghai Composite index, 30% of the Shenzhen 
Composite index and 40% of the Shanghai Government bond index, because approximately 40% of the 
total assets are invested in the bond market in the Chinese mutual fund industry. Most studies use the 
average of the Shanghai and Shenzhen market index as the market return (Zeng et al. 2015), as they are 
only concerned with the performance of equity mutual funds. 
8 Dong et al. (2014) examine the ownership structure in Chinese commercial banks from 2003 to 2011. 
9 Chen et al. (2017) investigate the ownership structure in Chinese privatized firms from 1981 to 2008. 
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Turning to foreign ownership, the sample mean of foreign ownership is 18.56 percent, 
while that of fund management companies with foreign investment is 49%, which is 
similar to the figures of Dong et al. (2014) and 33% by Lassoued et al. (2016). This 
means that almost half of Chinese mutual fund management companies have foreign 
investors. In Panel B of Table 2.1, we find that the mean of government-controlled 
companies was increased sharply from 65% in 2005 to 75% in 2008. At the same time, 
the average percentage of foreign ownership ratio (FO) was increased from 12.86% to 
21.4%. This increase is attributed to the regulation reforms in 2002.  
 
We also use ownership concentration 1, and ownership concentration 2. Ownership 
concentration1 is measured by the Herfindahl index which is equal to the sums of the 
squared ownership shares (Dong et al. 2014). High Herfindahl index would indicate the 
more concentrated the ownership of the mutual fund management company. Ownership 
concentration 2 is defined as the percentage of share owned by the largest shareholder 
(Dong et al. 2014). Table 2.1 presents that the mean of the ownership concentration 
ratio is 0.425. The mean of the largest shareholder’s holding is 50.17 percent. In 
addition, we observe an upward trend in the average ratio of ownership concentration 
1 during the sample period, with a stable increase from 0.38 to 0.47. 
 
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics of the ownership structure 
Variables Mean SD MIN MAX Median 
Panel A: Ownership structure 
GO (%) 54.54 27.59 0 100 52 
GCCs 0.7 0.457 0 1 1 
FO (%) 18.56 20.44 0 49 0 
FICs 0.49 0.5 0 1 0 
OC1 0.425 0.13 0.2 1 0.39 
OC2 50.17 13.22 20 100 49 
Panel B: Year by year ownership structure variables 
Year GO GCCs FO FICs OC1 
2005 55.0 0.65 12.86 0.36 0.38 
2006 56.2 0.69 14.05 0.38 0.37 
2007 55.7 0.74 18.97 0.47 0.41 
2008 59.0 0.75 21.4 0.54 0.42 
2009 54.0 0.7 21.5 0.55 0.42 
2010 54.3 0.7 21.4 0.57 0.42 
2011 53.3 0.72 21.64 0.58 0.41 
2012 53.5 0.69 19.47 0.53 0.41 
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2013 52.7 0.67 19.11 0.52 0.43 
2014 53.8 0.7 17.42 0.48 0.46 
2015 55.0 0.71 16.01 0.43 0.47 
Note: This table presents summary statistics the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum 
and median values for the variables used in analyzing funds’ performance and market share 
from 2005 to 2015. GO: Government ownership is the percentage of shares owned by a 
government agency; GCCs: Government–controlled companies is a dummy variable that equal 
to 1 if the largest shareholder agency and 0 otherwise; FO: Foreign ownership is the percentage 
of shares owned by foreign strategic investors; FICs: Foreign invested companies is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investors and 0 otherwise; 
OC1: ownership concentration1 is the ownership Herfindahl index (HHI) based on the 
ownership held by the shareholders of the mutual fund management company; OC2: ownership 
concentration2 is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. 
 
3.1.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for fund management company characteristic variables are 
provided in Table 2.2. Regarding the governance proxy shown in Panel A of Table 2.2, 
the sample mean of the market share is 1.44%, which is greater than the figures of 0.36% 
obtained by Khorana and Servaes (2012) for their U.S. sample. The mean of funds’ 
performance is 16%. 
 
In Panel B, we show some descriptive statistics of mutual fund management company 
specific variables, for instance, expense ratio, company experience, top-1 funds, 
company size, number of funds started and company focus. The average fund 
management company’s expense ratio is 1.9%. The sample mean of a fund management 
company’s risk is 5.48%, which is slightly higher than that of 3% obtained by Kong 
and Tang (2008). Furthermore, the average size of a fund management company is 36 
billion Chinese Yuan. The average number of new funds started is 3.33. Meanwhile, 
the average age of a fund management company is 7.41 years. The sample mean of top-
1 funds and company focus are 0.08 and 0.44, respectively.  
 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics. 
Variables Mean SD MIN MAX Median 
Panel A: Dependent variables      
Market share (%) 1.44 1.72 0.03 7.8 0.75 
Performance (%) 16 34.96 -60.76 158.27 6.99 
Panel B: Company-specific       
Expense ratio (%) 1.9 1.3 0.01 19.66 1.76 
Risk (%) 5.48 3.51 0.05 22.08 4.89 
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Company experience 7.41 4.23 1 18 7 
Top-1 funds 0.08 0.28 0 1 0 
Company focus 0.44 0.24 0.13 1 0.36 
Company size (in billions) 36 62.4 0.012 684 15.2 
No. of funds stated 3.33 4.23 0 34 2 
Note: This table presents summary statistics the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum 
and median values for the variables used in analyzing funds’ performance and market share 
from 2005 to 2015. Market share is calculated by the sum of all assets under management by 
each company divided by all assets under management in the fund industry; Performance is 
calculate by the weighted average of raw returns across all funds within the fund management 
company; Company size is the log of fund management company asset; Expense ratio is 
calculated by the weighted average of expense ratios across all funds within the fund 
management company; Risk is the funds’ return volatility is calculate by the weighted average 
of return volatility across all funds within the fund management company; Company experience 
is the number of years for a fund management company exists in the industry; Company top1 
is a dummy variable that equal to 1 if the fund management company has at least on the fund 
operating in the top1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl 
index based on investment objective in a fund management company; No. of funds started is 
total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year.  
 
3.1.4 Control variables 
Turning to control variables, we opt for the following: fund management company size, 
expense ratio, age, risk-taking behavior, top-1 funds, company focus and number of 
funds started. More specifically, fund management company size is measured by the 
log of total net assets managed by the fund management company. Larger fund 
management companies tend to perform better because of better concessions on trading 
commissions and more resources for research (Chen et al. 2004). Expense ratio is 
calculated by the weighted average of expense ratios across all funds within the same 
fund management company.  
 
Company experience is the number of years that a fund management company has 
existed in the industry. Fund management companies with greater experience tend to 
have a better performance. Top-1 funds is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
fund management company has at least one fund operating in the top-1 of a given 
category in a given year. Nanda et al. (2004) find that top-1 (or otherwise called star 
fund performer) contributes to greater cash inflow to the fund. This means that funds 
in top-1 might have a positive impact on fund management company market share. 
Company focus is measured by the Herfindahl index based on a fund management 
company’s investment objective. More focused fund management companies are easier 
to monitor and to develop expertise, as their investment strategies are less diverse 
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leading to superior performance and higher market share (Siggelkow 2003). Number 
of funds started is the total number of new funds started by a fund management 
company in a given year. 
 
4. Research design 
 
This paper opts for a fixed effect panel estimation to examine the impact of ownership 
structure on performance and market share. We control for omitted heterogeneous 
mutual fund management company-specific effects. Hence, the general model for 
measuring the relationship between a mutual fund management company’s ownership 
structure and performance and market share is: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
6
𝑗=1 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘
6
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                              (1) 
 
where t and i denote time period and mutual fund management companies and 
performance is the dependent variable and reflects funds’ performance; market share is 
the other dependent variable and reflects the ratio of assets managed by the fund 
management company to all the assets managed by the open-ended mutual fund 
industry. Ownership structure represents the government ownership ratio (GO), 
government-controlled companies (GCCs), foreign ownership (GO), foreign invested 
companies (FICs), ownership concentration1 (OC1) and ownership concentration2 
(OC2). CONTROL represents the control variables, namely the fund management 
company’s size, funds’ expense ratio, fund management company’s age, fund 
management company’s risk-taking behavior, top-1 funds, company focus and number 
of funds started, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error term. 
 
4.1 Empirical results 
 
We present next the empirical results relating to whether Chinese mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure would affect performance and market 
share after controlling for different mutual fund management company characteristics, 
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such as, company size, company experience, expense ratio, number of funds started and 
the degree of fund management company focus.  
 
4.1.1 Ownership, performance and market share  
 
Table 3 reports the regression results of the relationship between ownership structure 
and funds’ performance, see Models 1 and 2 for government ownership and 
government-controlled companies (GCCs) respectively. Models 3 and 4 examine the 
relationship between performance and the ownership ratio of foreign ownership and 
foreign invested companies (GICs) respectively.  
 
Table 3 The relationship between ownership and performance – Fixed effects. 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expenses 0.000299 0.000645 0.00565 0.00473 
 (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Company size 0.0991*** 0.0966*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0147) (0.0148) 
Company experience -0.205*** -0.197*** -0.209*** -0.210*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0386) (0.0352) (0.0352) 
No. of funds started -0.281*** -0.281*** -0.275*** -0.274*** 
 (0.0420) (0.0419) (0.0425) (0.0434) 
Top1 -0.0696** -0.0695** -0.0700** -0.0694** 
 (0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0296) (0.0293) 
Company Focus 0.189** 0.201** 0.198** 0.178** 
 (0.0828) (0.0825) (0.0809) (0.0759) 
Government ownership 0.00244*    
 (0.00137)    
GCCs  0.122*   
  (0.0677)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.0047***  
   (0.00178)  
FICs    -0.187*** 
    (0.0662) 
Constant -1.847*** -1.762*** -1.802*** -1.768*** 
 (0.271) (0.264) (0.305) (0.303) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
R2 0.442 0.441 0.449 0.451 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent 
variable is the funds’ performance. For the independent variables the paper adopts government 
ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; GCCs is the government-
controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government agency and 0 otherwise; 
Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs is the foreign invested 
companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments and 0 otherwise; 
Expenses is the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund 
management company; Company experience is the number of years of a fund management company 
exists in the industry; No of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund management 
company in a given year; Top1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least 
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on fund operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index 
of investment objective in a fund management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each 
investment objective’s share in total fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 
2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year 
of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the 
parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
 
The estimated coefficient for the ownership ratio of government ownership is positive 
and significant in Model 1. The result remains robust at the 10% level of significance, 
indicating that a higher level of government ownership could promote performance. 
This means that an increase of one unit in the percentage of government ownership is 
associated with an increase of approximately 0.2% in the funds’ performance. Results 
show government-controlled companies (GCCs) assert a positive impact (Table 3, 
Model 2). This implies that government-controlled companies tend to improve their 
performance, through the use of controlling benefits to monitor managers effectively 
and to collect important information (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Grossman and Hart 
1980; Borisova et al. 2012). Our finding is consistent with previous studies (Faccio et 
al. 2006; Chahrumiind et al. 2006; Chaney et al. 2011; Ben-Nasr 2016; Lin et al. 2016). 
 
Furthermore, in Models 3 and 4, we disaggregate the foreign ownership structure into 
the percentage of foreign ownership and the percentage of companies with foreign 
investment (FICs). Table 3 reports that foreign ownership asserts a negative effect on 
funds’ at the 1% level of significance (Table 3, Model 3), as in the previous study Chen 
et al. (2016). Similarly, we find that funds with foreign investment (FICs) would assert 
a negative impact on performance. The result remains robust at the 1% level of 
significance (Table 3, Model 4). One of possible explanation is that local fund company 
invested by foreign firms may be forced to invest in less risky assets. We will 
investigate the relationship between foreign ownership and risk-taking behavior in late 
section. In addition, Choi et al. (2012) and Douma et al. (2006) conclude that foreign 
companies have relational resources and networks abroad and may prefer to focus on 
the overseas market, especially as the investment is correlated with their core business. 
Therefore, local fund management companies with foreign ownership may prefer or be 
forced by foreign firms to invest more resources in overseas markets. However, we 
notice that fund management companies have relatively poor performance in global 
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market than local market.10 Our finding is opposite to that of Dong et al. (2017), Chen 
et al. (2017), Bena et al. (2017) and Lin and Fu (2017) as they find that foreign 
ownership results in excellent performance, especially in less developed countries.  
 
Table 4 presents results with market share as the dependent variable. As reported in 
Table 4, foreign ownership has a negative impact on fund management company’s 
market share (Table 4, Model 1), but it is statistically insignificant. In Model 2, we find 
that the coefficient of GCCs is statistically significant and negative, indicating that 
government-controlled companies are associated with a lower market. This implies that 
government-controlled mutual fund management companies are less competitive than 
the non-government funds.  
 
Table 4 The relationship between ownership structure and market share-Fixed effects. 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expenses -0.0123 -0.0131 -0.00523 -0.00559 
 (0.0383) (0.0400) (0.0393) (0.0402) 
Company size 0.446*** 0.460*** 0.457*** 0.458*** 
 (0.0958) (0.0979) (0.0999) (0.0995) 
Company experience -0.607*** -0.640*** -0.626*** -0.631*** 
 (0.171) (0.172) (0.167) (0.168) 
No. of funds started -0.133 -0.128 -0.124 -0.122 
 (0.161) (0.160) (0.158) (0.157) 
Top1 -0.0636 -0.0606 -0.0680 -0.0673 
 (0.0759) (0.0765) (0.0763) (0.0762) 
Company Focus 0.0956 0.0468 0.0888 0.0528 
 (0.472) (0.441) (0.460) (0.463) 
Government ownership -0.00515    
 (0.00826)    
GCCs  -0.708*   
  (0.384)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.00716*  
   (0.00408)  
FICs    -0.332** 
    (0.163) 
Constant -7.481*** -7.516*** -7.868*** -7.827*** 
 (1.975) (1.973) (2.261) (2.245) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
R2 0.218 0.230 0.220 0.222 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on market share for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent 
variable is market share. For the independent variables the paper adopts government ownership: it is the 
percentage of share owned by a government agency; GCCs is the government-controlled companies and 
equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government agency and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the 
 
10 According to CSMAR database, we calculate the average return of investments in global equities for 
all fund management companies which is much lower than the average fund management company return 
in our sample period. 
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percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs is the foreign invested companies and equals to 1 
if a fund management company has foreign investments and 0 otherwise; Expense is the funds’ expense 
ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management company; Company 
experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the industry; No of funds 
started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Top 1 is a 
dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund operating in the top 1 of a 
given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in a fund 
management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each investment objective’s share in total 
fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year 
dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 
1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard 
errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
Concerning the impact of the foreign ownership structure on the market share, we show 
that the ownership ratio of foreign shareholders has a negative impact on a fund 
management company’s market share at the 10% level of significance (Table 4, Model 
3). A similar pattern is observed in Model 4, as the coefficient of companies with 
foreign investments (FICs) is statistically negative at the 1% level of significance.  
 
Overall, the above discussed findings suggest that fund management companies with 
foreign ownership are linked with a lower market share and a lower performance than 
those of without foreign ownership. These results would not support our second 
hypothesis (H2) which states that foreign ownership would assert a positive impact on 
funds’ performance and market share. However, these results are in line with 
Hypothesis H1 as it claims that government ownership would impact upon performance 
and market share.  
 
4.1.2 Concentration of ownership, funds’ performance and market share  
 
In this section we focus on the concentration of ownership.  Chen et al. (2013) argues 
that highly concentrated ownership structure to government would make it difficult for 
foreign investors to become the controlling party. In the descriptive, see Table 2, we 
show that more than 70% of Chinese fund management companies are controlled by 
government agencies. In addition, an increase in foreign ownership in a fund 
management company would also cause more conflicts of interest between domestic 
shareholders ownership and foreign shareholders. Thus, foreign shareholders might not 
effectively improve the company’s management skills and governance quality. Foreign 
institutional investors might misunderstand (or not be aware of) the financial and 
institutional environment in China. For instance, anecdotal evidence claims that a 
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dominant investment strategy in China is short-term investment strategies, at least as 
supported by large domestic Chinese funds.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions that examine how the ownership 
concentration affects performance and market share.  The coefficient on OC1 is 
negative in the regression of performance (Table 5, Model 1), while the coefficient on 
OC1 is significantly positive in the regression of the market share (Table 5, Model 3) 
at the 1% level of significance. In addition, we find that OC2 has a positive impact of 
on a fund management company’s market share at the 10% level of significance (Table 
5, Model 4). However, the impact of OC2 on funds’ performance is statistically 
insignificant (Table 5, Model 2).  
 
Table 5 The relationship between ownership concentration and performance and 
market share-fixed effects. 
Dependent variable Performance Market share 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expenses 0.000745 0.000582 -0.0191 -0.0157 
 (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0395) (0.0388) 
Company size 0.0993*** 0.0989*** 0.429*** 0.439*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.100) (0.0979) 
Company experience -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.641*** -0.631*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0372) (0.159) (0.163) 
No. of funds started -0.281*** -0.280*** -0.115 -0.130 
 (0.0422) (0.0421) (0.147) (0.152) 
Top 1 -0.0687** -0.0686** -0.0602 -0.0701 
 (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0762) (0.0758) 
Company Focus 0.195** 0.195** 0.0875 0.0932 
 (0.0825) (0.0828) (0.455) (0.453) 
OC1 -0.0480  2.239***  
 (0.192)  (0.761)  
OC2  0.000176  0.0156* 
  (0.00145)  (0.00911) 
Constant -1.711*** -1.728*** -8.240*** -8.324*** 
 (0.290) (0.290) (2.273) (2.321) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
R2 0.438 0.438 0.240 0.229 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership concentration on performance and market share for the period 2005 
to 2015. The dependent variable is the funds’ performance and market share. For the independent 
variables the paper adopts OC1: it is herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the shareholders 
of the mutual fund management company; OC2 is the percentage of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder; Expense is the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by 
the fund management company; Company experience is the number of years of a fund management 
company exists in the industry; No of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund 
management company in a given year; Top 1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management 
company has at least on fund operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus 
is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in a fund management company and is the sum of squared 
fractions of each investment objective’s share in total fund management company value; the financial 
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crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for 
instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The 
numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance 
at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
Overall, ownership concentration is positively related to market share in line with 
Hypothesis 3. This means that a higher ownership concentration would increase the 
incentive for, and power of, large shareholders to monitor management and mitigate 
the free-rider problem of small shareholders, thus helping to increase the fund 
management company’s market share. This result is supported by previous studies by 
Dong et al. (2014), Nguyen et al. (2015) and Dong et al. (2017) as they report that 
highly concentrated ownership promotes the quality of corporate governance and 
improves monitoring of management. In addition, since we observe government-
controlled companies assert a positive impact on funds’ performance in Table 3 (Model 
2), it appears to capture some ownership concentration effect.  
 
4.1.3 The interaction between government and foreign ownership  
 
Table 6 reports that the coefficient of the interaction term of the ownership ratio of 
government shareholders and foreign invested companies (FICs) is significantly 
positive at the 5% significance level (see Model 1). In addition, the interaction term of 
government-controlled companies (GCCs) and foreign invested companies (FICs) has 
a positive impact on funds’ performance (see Table 6, Model 2) at the 5% significance 
level. These findings suggest that funds’ performance is positively associated with 
government ownership and government-controlled companies (GCCs) in the presence 
of some foreign ownership in those funds. Similarly, foreign investment has a positive 
impact on funds’ performance only in the case of companies with a high level of 
government ownership or companies controlled by a government agency. This result 
appears to confirm our second hypothesis (H2). In contrast, Chen et al. (2017) find that 
if the government holds a majority equity stake, the effect of foreign ownership on 
investment efficiency is declined.  
 
Furthermore, as reported in Model 3 in relation to a funds’ market share, the coefficient 
on the interaction term of government ownership and foreign invested companies (FICs) 
is positive, but it is statistically insignificant. We also find that a fund management 
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company’s market share is not statistically significantly related to the interaction term 
of government-controlled companies (GCCs) and foreign invested companies (FICs).  
 
Table 6 Interaction term between government ownership and foreign ownership. 
Dependent variable Performance Market share 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expenses 0.00588 0.00608 -0.00131 -0.00537 
 (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0388) (0.0405) 
Company size 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.462*** 0.472*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0977) (0.0987) 
Company experience -0.218*** -0.211*** -0.630*** -0.657*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0364) (0.167) (0.171) 
No. of funds started -0.281*** -0.279*** -0.126 -0.118 
 (0.0433) (0.0436) (0.156) (0.157) 
Top1 -0.0665** -0.0684** -0.0605 -0.0616 
 (0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0765) (0.0764) 
Company Focus 0.163** 0.170** 0.0500 0.0125 
 (0.0772) (0.0761) (0.461) (0.441) 
Government ownership 0.000935  -0.00800  
 (0.00124)  (0.00812)  
FICs -0.348*** -0.345*** -0.597* -0.372* 
 (0.0932) (0.0652) (0.359) (0.206) 
Government ownership*FICs 0.00354**  0.00401  
 (0.00162)  (0.00625)  
GCCs  0.0892  -0.720* 
  (0.0769)  (0.382) 
GCCs*FICs  0.219**  0.0471 
  (0.0852)  (0.231) 
Constant -1.833*** -1.800*** -7.456*** -7.595*** 
 (0.280) (0.282) (1.913) (1.957) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
R2 0.455 0.457 0.228 0.237 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance and market share for the period 2005 to 
2015. The dependent variable is the funds’ performance and market share. For the independent variables 
the paper adopts government ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; 
GCCs is the government-controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government 
agency and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs 
is the foreign invested companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments 
and 0 otherwise; Government ownership*FICs is the interaction term between government ownership 
and foreign invested companies; GCCs*FICs is the interaction term between government-controlled 
companies and foreign invested companies; Expense is the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log 
of total net assets managed by the fund management company; Company experience is the number of 
years of a fund management company exists in the industry; No of funds started is the total number of 
funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Top 1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the 
fund management company has at least on fund operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; 
Company focus is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in a fund management company and is 
the sum of squared fractions of each investment objective’s share in total fund management company 
value; the financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not 
reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the 
value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 
10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
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Tables 7.1 and 7.2 report the results for the interaction terms of ownership 
concentration and government ownership. We find evidence that a high degree of 
ownership concentration might improve the performance of government-controlled 
companies (GCCs), as the coefficient on ownership concentration 2 and government-
controlled companies (GCCs) is significantly positive (see Table 7.1, Model 4) at the 
5% significance level. This result further confirms our first hypothesis (H1) and 
suggests that a highly concentrated government ownership could promote funds’ 
performance. By contrast, Gunasekarage et al. (2007) find that a highly concentrated 
government-controlled company has a negative and significant impact on its 
performance.  
 
Table 7.1 Interaction term between government ownership and ownership 
concentration. 
Dependent variable Performance 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expenses 0.00107 0.000687 0.000513 0.000431 
 (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
Company size 0.0999*** 0.0968*** 0.0982*** 0.0956*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0144) 
Company experience -0.200*** -0.197*** -0.203*** -0.198*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0384) 
No. of funds started -0.280*** -0.281*** -0.278*** -0.278*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0427) (0.0425) (0.0428) 
Top 1 -0.0724** -0.0732** -0.0685** -0.0694** 
 (0.0304) (0.0309) (0.0306) (0.0309) 
Company Focus 0.192** 0.200** 0.189** 0.198** 
 (0.0812) (0.0803) (0.0818) (0.0806) 
Government ownership -0.000961  -0.000295  
 (0.00295)  (0.00278)  
OC1 -0.974 -0.783   
 (0.622) (0.638)   
Government ownership*OC1 0.00991    
 (0.00654)    
GCCs  -0.187  -0.261 
  (0.243)  (0.200) 
GCCs*OC1  0.844   
  (0.650)   
OC2   -0.00509 -0.00604 
   (0.00405) (0.00371) 
Government ownership*OC2   5.76e-05  
   (4.46e-05)  
GCCs*OC2    0.00798* 
    (0.00406) 
Constant -1.512*** -1.473*** -1.589*** -1.452*** 
 (0.318) (0.328) (0.327) (0.319) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
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R2 0.445 0.444 0.443 0.444 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance and market share for the period 2005 to 
2015. The dependent variable is the funds’ performance and market share. For the independent variables 
the paper adopts government ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; 
GCCs is the government-controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government 
agency and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs 
is the foreign invested companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments 
and 0 otherwise; Ownership concentration1 is Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 
shareholders of the mutual fund management company; Ownership concentration2 is the percentage of 
shares owned by the largest shareholder; Government ownership*OC1 is the interaction term between 
government ownership and ownership concentration1; GCCs*OC1 is the interaction term between 
government-controlled companies and ownership concentration1; Government ownership*OC2 is the 
interaction term between government ownership and ownership concentration2; GCCs*FICs is the 
interaction term between government-controlled companies and foreign invested companies; Expense is 
the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management 
company; Company experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the 
industry; No of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a 
given year; Top 1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund 
operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of 
investment objective in a fund management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each 
investment objective’s share in total fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 
2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year 
of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the 
parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; 
*** significance at the 1% level. 
 
Furthermore, according to Models 5 and 7 of Table 7.2, the market share of companies 
with increased ownership concentration is higher for fund management companies that 
have a greater proportion of government ownership. The estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term are statistically significant. We also find a significantly positive 
relationship between market share and the interaction term of ownership concentration 
and government-controlled companies in Models 6 and 8 of Table 7.2. Thus, a higher 
level of ownership concentration would increase the market share. In other words, fund 
management company’s quality of governance is positively correlated with government 
ownership in the case of those companies with highly concentrated ownership. This 
finding would support our third hypothesis (H3).  
 
With respect to the effect of control variables, we find that the expense ratio has no 
impact on funds’ performance and market share. This result does not support the 
findings of Khorana and Servaes’ (2012) study, which claims that the expense ratio has 
a negative and highly significant impact on market share. Additionally, the coefficients 
on fund management company size are significantly positive for both funds’ 
performance and market share across all models. This finding is consistent with the 
previous study by Chou et al. (2011).  
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Turning now to the impact of company experience, it has a negative impact on funds’ 
performance and market share in all models. The results remain robust at the 1% 
significance level. These results illustrate that an increase in a fund management 
company’s age does not improve performance and market share. In addition, the 
number of new funds stated has a negative effect on a funds’ performance and market 
share. However, the results are only statistically significant for funds’ performance. The 
negative effect could be caused by the extra expenses involved in opening new funds 
or the dilution in management focus as a result of establishing new funds. This finding 
is not in line with the study by Khorana and Servaes (2012). 
 
Table 7.2 Interaction term between government ownership and ownership 
concentration. 
Dependent variable Market share 
Model Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Expenses -0.0176 -0.0202 -0.0147 -0.0167 
 (0.0377) (0.0407) (0.0373) (0.0399) 
Company size 0.419*** 0.442*** 0.426*** 0.450*** 
 (0.0915) (0.0985) (0.0922) (0.0980) 
Company experience -0.608*** -0.671*** -0.607*** -0.661*** 
 (0.155) (0.161) (0.159) (0.167) 
No. of funds started -0.0971 -0.107 -0.106 -0.114 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) 
Top 1 -0.0649 -0.0699 -0.0604 -0.0644 
 (0.0784) (0.0786) (0.0763) (0.0772) 
Company Focus 0.143 0.0416 0.124 0.0454 
 (0.447) (0.424) (0.452) (0.430) 
Government ownership -0.0350***  -0.0309**  
 (0.0120)  (0.0144)  
OC1 -1.495 -0.786   
 (1.128) (0.832)   
Government ownership*OC1 0.0561***    
 (0.0157)    
GCCs  -2.133***  -2.071*** 
  (0.650)  (0.724) 
GCCs*OC1  3.704***   
  (0.956)   
OC2   -0.00754 -0.00504 
   (0.0100) (0.00678) 
Government ownership*OC2   0.000392*  
   (0.000220)  
GCCs*OC2    0.0278** 
    (0.0135) 
Constant -5.923*** -6.811*** -6.363*** -7.024*** 
 (1.709) (1.842) (2.030) (2.103) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
R2 0.267 0.265 0.249 0.252 
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Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance and market share for the period 2005 to 
2015. The dependent variable is the funds’ performance and market share. For the independent variables 
the paper adopts government ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; 
GCCs is the government-controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government 
agency and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs 
is the foreign invested companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments 
and 0 otherwise; Ownership concentration1 is Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 
shareholders of the mutual fund management company; Ownership concentration2 is the percentage of 
shares owned by the largest shareholder; Government ownership*OC1 is the interaction term between 
government ownership and ownership concentration1; GCCs*OC1 is the interaction term between 
government-controlled companies and ownership concentration1; Government ownership*OC2 is the 
interaction term between government ownership and ownership concentration2; GCCs*FICs is the 
interaction term between government-controlled companies and foreign invested companies; Expense is 
the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management 
company; Company experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the 
industry; No of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a 
given year; Top 1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund 
operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of 
investment objective in a fund management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each 
investment objective’s share in total fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 
2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year 
of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the 
parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
Additionally, we find that the top-performing fund has a negative impact on funds’ 
performance. This finding means that the presence of a top-performing fund in a fund 
management company’s portfolio reduces the funds’ performance. However, the 
negative coefficient on the top-performing fund is not statistically significant with 
regard to fund management company’s market share. This result is not consistent with 
the study by Khorana and Servaes (2012), as they state that the presence of a top–
performing fund has a positive and significant impact. Finally, we also find that the 
Herfindahl index across objectives (Company focus) has a positive and significant 
impact on funds’ performance, while its influence on the company’s market share is 
insignificant. This finding shows that more focused fund management companies are 
able to deliver higher returns in Chinese mutual fund market (Siggekow 2003). 
 
4.1.4 Dealing with endogeneity: the GMM estimation 
 
To address endogeneity issues,  we follow Khorana and Servaes (2012) and adopt the 
two-step system dynamic GMM estimators (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and 
Bond 2000) with bias–corrected robust standard errors, which was introduced by 
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Windmeijer (2005). 11 The endogeneity issue might arise as ownership structure may 
be determined by performance or market share. In order to apply the dynamic GMM 
approach, we include one lag of dependent variable as an independent variable in the 
regression. The results of the two–step system GMM estimator are tested via Hansen’s 
diagnostic test for instrument validity, and by Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test for 
second–order autocorrelation of the error terms. As shown in the model presented in 
equations (2), we regress the performance and market share on a set of ownership 
structure and control variables, as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛽𝑗
6
𝑗=1 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
6
𝑘=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    
(2) 
 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 address the endogeneity issue by employing the two–step ‘system’ 
dynamic GMM approach. Moreover, regarding the basic diagnostics, the tests AR(2) 
for second order autocorrelation in second differences and the Hansen J–statistics of 
over–identifying restrictions are insignificant in all the corresponding models (see 
Tables 8, 9 and 10). The instrument variables are the lag of each independent variable. 
 
Table 8 The relationship between ownership structure and performance – GMM 
Dependent variable Performance 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. Performance 0.255*** 0.205*** 0.264*** 0.263*** 
 (0.051) (0.0588) (0.058) (0.0606) 
Expenses -0.0330* -0.141*** -0.0380 -0.0368 
 (0.0191) (0.0464) (0.0243) (0.0258) 
Company size 0.0499** 0.0683* 0.0411 0.0414 
 (0.0241) (0.0364) (0.0300) (0.0292) 
Company experience -0.0147 -0.137 0.0385 0.0513 
 (0.0603) (0.110) (0.0619) (0.0602) 
No. of funds started -0.313*** -0.232*** -0.310*** -0.310*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0839) (0.0524) (0.0675) 
Top1 -0.0687* -0.425** -0.0717* -0.0623 
 (0.0391) (0.163) (0.0387) (0.0390) 
Company Focus 0.598*** 0.944*** 0.614*** 0.614*** 
 (0.129) (0.220) (0.126) (0.125) 
Government ownership 0.00408**    
 (0.00166)    
GCCs  0.443***   
  (0.163)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.009***  
 
11 This paper employs Roodman’s (2009) “Xtabond2” specification in Stata. 
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   (0.00308)  
FICs    -0.375*** 
    (0.0979) 
Constant -1.237** -1.459* -0.754 -0.762 
 (0.519) (0.801) (0.636) (0.622) 
Observations 637 637 637 637 
AR (2) 0.235 0.508 0.277 0.351 
Hansen p value 0.357 0.446 0.564 0.42 
Note: The table reports results of the GMM estimator investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent 
variable is the funds’ performance. For the independent variables the paper adopts government 
ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; GCCs is the government-
controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government agency and 0 otherwise; 
Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs is the foreign invested 
companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments and 0 otherwise; 
L.Performance is the one year lagged of funds’ performance; Expense is the funds’ expense ratio; 
Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management company; Company 
experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the industry; No of funds 
started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Top 1 is a 
dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund operating in the top 1 of a 
given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in a fund 
management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each investment objective’s share in total 
fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year 
dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 
1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard 
errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
 
The two–step system dynamic GMM estimation results for the impact of ownership 
structure on funds’ performance are presented in Table 8. We find that the coefficients 
on government ownership and government–controlled fund management companies 
are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% (see Table 8, Model 1) level and 
at the 1% significance level (see Table 8, Model 2). However, the coefficients on 
foreign ownership and foreign invested companies are both statistically negative at the 
1% (see Table 8, Models 3 and 4) significance level. These results are in line with the 
previous studies by Chen et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2016).  
 
With regard to a fund’s market share, see Table 9, the results indicate that government-
controlled companies (GCCs) are negatively associated with market share. This 
association is statistically significant at the 5% (see Table 9, Model 2) level. In Models 
3 and 4, we find that the coefficients for foreign ownership and foreign invested 
companies (FICs) load negatively at the 5% level, suggesting that a higher level of 
foreign ownership (or foreign participation) could reduce a funds’ market share.  
 
 
Table 9 The relationship between ownership structure and market share-GMM 
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Dependent variable Market share 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L.Market share 0.621*** 0.492*** 0.535*** 0.525*** 
 (0.0798) (0.0868) (0.0852) (0.0843) 
Expenses -0.510*** -0.0982 -0.0704 -0.0725 
 (0.156) (0.0765) (0.0732) (0.0721) 
Company size 0.107 0.392*** 0.308*** 0.306*** 
 (0.111) (0.0632) (0.0669) (0.0656) 
Company experience 0.0108 0.0845 -0.0290 0.00919 
 (0.162) (0.168) (0.157) (0.151) 
No. of funds started -0.228 -0.692*** -0.192 -0.198 
 (0.170) (0.216) (0.151) (0.148) 
Top1 0.0209 -0.0468 0.00562 0.0227 
 (0.101) (0.0970) (0.0835) (0.0806) 
Company Focus 0.150 0.654 0.488 0.522 
 (0.543) (0.438) (0.402) (0.396) 
Government ownership -0.00132    
 (0.00439)    
GCCs  -0.889**   
  (0.444)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.0160**  
   (0.00720)  
FICs    -0.535** 
    (0.236) 
Constant -0.921 -7.789*** -6.165*** -6.211*** 
 (2.704) (1.365) (1.523) (1.481) 
Observations 637 637 637 637 
AR (2) 0.407 0.992 0.939 0.943 
Hansen p value 0.339 0.393 0.27 0.301 
Note: The table reports results of the GMM estimator investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on market share for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent 
variable is fund management company’s market share. For the independent variables the paper adopts 
government ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; GCCs is the 
government-controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government agency and 
0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs is the foreign 
invested companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments and 0 
otherwise; L.Market share is the one year lagged of fund management company’s market share; Expense 
is the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management 
company; Company experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the 
industry; No of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a 
given year; Top 1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund 
operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of 
investment objective in a fund management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each 
investment objective’s share in total fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 
2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year 
of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the 
parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; 
*** significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Finally, Table 10 reports the system GMM estimation results for how the ownership 
concentration ratio affects funds’ performance and market share. The results reveal that 
the ownership concentration ratio has no impact on funds’ performance and market 
share according to Models 1 and 2. Furthermore, we find that the coefficients on 
ownership concentration1 and ownership concentration2 are both significantly positive 
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at the 1% significance level (see Table 10, Model 3) and 10% level of significance (see 
Table 10, Model 4), indicating that a further increase in ownership concentration would 
promote the growth of a fund management company in the Chinese market (Dong et al. 
2014; Nguyen et al. 2015; Dong et al. 2017). Overall, these findings are generally 
consistent with the main findings from the fixed effect models (from Table 3 to Table 
5). 
Table 10 The relationship between ownership concentration and performance and 
market share-GMM 
Dependent variable Performance Market share 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. Performance 0.259*** 0.282***   
 (0.0537) (0.0643)   
L.Market share   0.886*** 0.878*** 
   (0.0828) (0.0884) 
Expenses -0.0360* -0.190*** -0.160* -0.156** 
 (0.0203) (0.0407) (0.0838) (0.0776) 
Company size 0.0558** 0.0504 -0.104 -0.0874 
 (0.0268) (0.0341) (0.154) (0.161) 
Company experience 0.00175 -0.112 0.0505 0.0529 
 (0.0543) (0.101) (0.179) (0.198) 
No. of funds started -0.298*** -0.281*** 0.444** 0.395 
 (0.0389) (0.0762) (0.220) (0.244) 
Top 1 -0.0776* -0.668*** -0.0539 0.217 
 (0.0399) (0.221) (0.100) (0.498) 
Company Focus 0.670*** 0.759*** 0.634* 0.688 
 (0.116) (0.169) (0.358) (0.501) 
Ownership concentration1 -0.502  1.744***  
 (0.437)  (0.637)  
Ownership concentration2  0.000857  0.0158* 
  (0.00377)  (0.00877) 
Constant -1.007* -0.618 1.674 1.206 
 (0.537) (0.669) (3.311) (3.462) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
AR (2) 0.306 0.365 0.835 0.803 
Hansen p value 0.378 0.355 0.254 0.195 
Note: The table reports results of the GMM estimator investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance and market share for the period 2005 to 
2015. The dependent variable is the funds’ performance and market share. For the independent variables 
the paper adopts ownership concentration1: it is herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 
shareholders of the mutual fund management company; Ownership concentration2 is the percentage of 
shares owned by the largest shareholder; L.Performance is the one year lagged of funds’ performance; 
L.Market share is the one year lagged of fund management company’s market share; Expense is the 
funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management company; 
Company experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the industry; No 
of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Top 
1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund operating in the top 
1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in 
a fund management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each investment objective’s share in 
total fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year 
dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 
1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard 
errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
4.1.5 Further analysis of the impact of foreign ownership 
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As previous discussed, foreign ownership has a negative impact on funds’ performance 
and market share in China. In order to further explain this finding, we examine the 
impact of foreign ownership on funds’ risk-taking behavior.  The results are reported 
in Table 11. We find that the government ownership has a positive and statistically 
insignificant impact on a funds’ risk-taking behavior in Model 1. The result is similar 
when the government-controlled companies (GCCs) variable is employed in Model 2. 
The relationship between risk-taking behavior and government-controlled companies 
(GCCs) is positive but statistically insignificant. The insignificant results for 
government ownership suggest that government shareholders cannot help fund 
management companies to improve their level of risk control. The findings are 
inconsistent with the previous study by Tee et al. (2018), as they claim that politically 
connected firms are positively connected with risk level. 
 
Table 11 The relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking-Fixed effect. 
Dependent variable Risk-taking 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expenses 0.824*** 0.826*** 0.874*** 0.862*** 
 (0.258) (0.261) (0.252) (0.252) 
Company assets 1.496*** 1.473*** 1.563*** 1.551*** 
 (0.201) (0.209) (0.211) (0.209) 
Company experience -2.577*** -2.516*** -2.623*** -2.632*** 
 (0.459) (0.470) (0.438) (0.432) 
No. of funds started -2.432*** -2.439*** -2.377*** -2.377*** 
 (0.483) (0.483) (0.485) (0.488) 
Top1 -0.167 -0.170 -0.175 -0.169 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.273) (0.272) 
Company Focus 1.205 1.295 1.269 1.088 
 (1.121) (1.103) (1.085) (1.022) 
Government ownership 0.0134    
 (0.0189)    
GCCs  1.145   
  (1.336)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.0442**  
   (0.0210)  
FICs    -1.607** 
    (0.761) 
Constant -26.53*** -26.22*** -26.60*** -26.24*** 
 (3.996) (3.993) (4.514) (4.477) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
R2 0.254 0.255 0.264 0.263 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on risk for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable 
is the funds’ risk-taking. For the independent variables the paper adopts government ownership: it is the 
percentage of share owned by a government agency; GCCs is the government-controlled companies and 
equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government agency and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the 
percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs is the foreign invested companies and equals to 1 
if a fund management company has foreign investments and 0 otherwise; Expense is the funds’ expense 
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ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management company; Company 
experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the industry; No of funds 
started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Top 1 is a 
dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund operating in the top 1 of a 
given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in a fund 
management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each investment objective’s share in total 
fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year 
dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 
1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard 
errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
Furthermore, with regard to foreign ownership, Table 11 reveals that the coefficient on 
the ownership ratio of foreign shareholders is significantly negative in Model 3, 
suggesting that a higher level of foreign ownership in a fund management company 
means that the company tends to take fewer risks. We also find that foreign investment 
(FICs) has a negative impact on a funds’ risk-taking hehavior at the 5% (Table 11, 
Model 4) significance level. This is in line with several previous studies (Umutlu et al. 
2010; Li et al. 2011; Lassoued et al. 2016), but contradicts the findings of Chen et al. 
(2013) and partially contradicts with the findings of Lee and Hsieh (2014). Lee and 
Hsieh (2014) offer evidence that foreign ownership has an inverse U–shaped impact on 
stability in the banking industry. Furthermore, this finding helps to explain the negative 
correlation between foreign ownership and funds’ performance and market share, as 
foreign shareholders might prefer to invest in less risky assets. 
 
Table 12 shows the GMM estimation regressions so as to address concerns regarding 
endogeneity. Results remain consistent with the main findings above in Table 11. Note 
that there is a significant dynamic adjustment as indicated by the coefficient of lagged 
risk. Moreover, once more we find that the coefficient on the ownership ratio of foreign 
shareholders is significantly negative in Model 3, suggesting that a higher level of 
foreign ownership in a fund management company means that the company tends to 
take fewer risks. Similarly, the coefficient of FICs, indicating funds with foreign 
investment, is highly significant and negative, whilst also it carries a big magnitude. It 
seems indeed that foreign investors are not keen to invest in risky funds. 
 
Table 12 The relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking-GMM. 
Dependent variable Risk-taking 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. Risk 0.310** 0.210* 0.337** 0.341** 
 (0.150) (0.107) (0.140) (0.135) 
Expenses 0.368 0.375 0.388 0.446 
 (0.402) (0.407) (0.342) (0.298) 
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Company size 1.168*** 1.616*** 1.119*** 1.146*** 
 (0.391) (0.419) (0.413) (0.355) 
Company experience -0.217 -2.019** -0.158 -0.188 
 (0.656) (0.801) (0.602) (0.621) 
No. of funds started -3.794*** -2.721*** -3.520*** -3.545*** 
 (0.735) (0.957) (0.691) (0.741) 
Top1 -0.117 0.116 -0.0641 -0.108 
 (0.439) (0.449) (0.399) (0.411) 
Company Focus 5.627*** 7.304*** 5.670*** 5.358*** 
 (2.016) (1.856) (1.561) (1.680) 
Government ownership 0.0115    
 (0.0253)    
GCCs  2.527   
  (1.789)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.0669**  
   (0.0328)  
FICs    -2.848** 
    (1.205) 
Constant -24.73*** -33.58*** -22.08** -22.45*** 
 (7.969) (8.712) (8.618) (7.539) 
Observations 637 637 637 637 
AR(2) 0.129 0.188 0.118 0.119 
Hansen p value 0.31 0.503 0.362 0.273 
Note: The table reports results of the GMM estimator investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on risk for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable 
is funds’ risk-taking. For the independent variables the paper adopts government ownership: it is the 
percentage of share owned by a government agency; GCCs is the government-controlled companies and 
equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government agency and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the 
percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs is the foreign invested companies and equals to 1 
if a fund management company has foreign investments and 0 otherwise; L.risk is the one year lagged 
of funds’ risk-taking; Expense is the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets 
managed by the fund management company; Company experience is the number of years of a fund 
management company exists in the industry; No of funds started is the total number of funds started by 
a fund management company in a given year; Top 1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management 
company has at least on fund operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus 
is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in a fund management company and is the sum of squared 
fractions of each investment objective’s share in total fund management company value; the financial 
crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for 
instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The 
numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance 
at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
 
4.1.6 Robustness Check 
As robustness we measure funds’ performance as abnormal return. Abnormal return is 
the difference between the funds’ return and market return. Results remain relatively 
consistent with the prior main findings, see Models 3 and 4. However, the positive 
relationship between government ownership and funds’ performance is weakened when 
we take into account abnormal market return into the model. This finding is comparable 
with study by Berkowitz and Qiu (2003), as they state that ownership structure of 
mutual fund management companies is irrelevant with funds’ risk-adjusted returns. 
 35 
This finding also helps to explain the negative relationship between government 
ownership and market share, as government-controlled fund management companies 
might perform inferior compared to capital market. 
 
Table13 The relationship between ownership structure and performance (Robustness 
Check). 
Dependent variable Performance 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expenses 0.00245 0.00259 0.00483 0.00436 
 (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0113) 
Company size 0.0422*** 0.0411*** 0.0453*** 0.0449*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0114) 
Company experience 0.00977 0.0132 0.00820 0.00755 
 (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0287) (0.0290) 
No. of funds started -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0260) 
Top 1 -0.0689*** -0.0688*** -0.0691*** -0.0688*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0233) 
Company Focus  0.0831 0.0882 0.0871 0.0780 
 (0.0685) (0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0654) 
Government ownership 0.00103    
 (0.000947)    
GCCs  0.0528   
  (0.0583)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.00210*  
   (0.00117)  
FICs    -0.0807* 
    (0.0441) 
Constant -1.020*** -0.984*** -1.003*** -0.987*** 
 (0.234) (0.231) (0.245) (0.245) 
Observations 731 731 731 731 
R2 0.115 0.115 0.120 0.121 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent 
variable is funds’ performance which is measured by abnormal return. For the independent variables the 
paper adopts government ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; GCCs 
is the government-controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government agency 
and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs is the 
foreign invested companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments and 
0 otherwise; Expense is the funds’ expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by 
the fund management company; Company experience is the number of years of a fund management 
company exists in the industry; No of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund 
management company in a given year; Top 1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management 
company has at least on fund operating in the top 1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus 
is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in a fund management company and is the sum of squared 
fractions of each investment objective’s share in total fund management company value; the financial 
crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for 
instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The 
numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance 
at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 14 reports GMM estimations so as to take into account issues related to the 
endogeneity. Once more, we confirm that the ownership ratio of foreign shareholders 
asserts a significantly negative impact see Model 3, whilst foreign investment also 
carries a negative sign see Model 4. 
 
Table 14 The relationship between ownership structure and performance-GMM 
(Robustness Check). 
Dependent variable Performance 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. Performance -0.111** -0.106** -0.104** -0.100** 
 (0.0477) (0.0413) (0.0469) (0.0427) 
Expenses 0.0167 0.0181 0.0214 0.0194 
 (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0214) (0.0158) 
Company size 0.0607*** 0.0576*** 0.0629*** 0.0621*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0134) (0.0162) (0.0157) 
Company experience -0.00773 -0.00844 -0.0137 -0.0124 
 (0.0256) (0.0282) (0.0321) (0.0283) 
No. of funds started -0.149*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.141*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0337) (0.0332) (0.0330) 
Top 1 -0.0458 -0.0469* -0.0495* -0.0501** 
 (0.0276) (0.0253) (0.0268) (0.0249) 
Company Focus  0.102 0.103 0.0971 0.0943 
 (0.0885) (0.0951) (0.0906) (0.0951) 
Government ownership 0.000526    
 (0.00151)    
GCCs  0.0889   
  (0.0893)   
Foreign Ownership   -0.00262*  
   (0.00146)  
FICs    -0.101* 
    (0.0559) 
Constant -1.406*** -1.372*** -1.378*** -1.355*** 
 (0.379) (0.307) (0.353) (0.348) 
Observations 637 637 637 637 
AR (2) 0.393 0.37 0.347 0.349 
Hansen p value 0.678 0.651 0.447 0.484 
Note: The table reports results of the GMM estimator investigating the contractual mutual fund 
management company’s ownership structure on performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent 
variable is the funds’ performance which is measured by abnormal return. For the independent variables 
the paper adopts government ownership: it is the percentage of share owned by a government agency; 
GCCs is the government-controlled companies and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a government 
agency and 0 otherwise; Foreign ownership is the percentage of share owned by foreign investors; FICs 
is the foreign invested companies and equals to 1 if a fund management company has foreign investments 
and 0 otherwise; L.Performance is the one year lagged of funds’ performance; Expense is the funds’ 
expense ratio; Company size the log of total net assets managed by the fund management company; 
Company experience is the number of years of a fund management company exists in the industry; No 
of funds started is the total number of funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Top 
1 is a dummy and equals to 1 if the fund management company has at least on fund operating in the top 
1 of a given category in a given year; Company focus is the Herfindahl index of investment objective in 
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a fund management company and is the sum of squared fractions of each investment objective’s share in 
total fund management company value; the financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009 is a series of  year 
dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2008 which takes the value of 
1 if the year is 2008 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard 
errors, *significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The Chinese financial sector has undergone several important reforms during the recent 
decades, particularly in the mutual fund industry. The mutual fund industry is 
characterized by highly concentrated corporate ownership structure and weak minority 
shareholder protection. Against this background of concentrated ownership, we 
investigate the impact of ownership structure on funds’ performance and market share 
over the period 2005-2015, employing manually collected data.  
 
Our evidence suggests that government ownership tends to have a greater influence on 
funds’ performance than market share, as we find that government ownership is 
positively related with funds’ performance and find that insignificant relationship 
between government ownership and market share. These results are in line with our 
hypotheses and are consistent with previous studies (Faccio et al. 2006; Chahrumiind 
et al. 2006; Chaney et al. 2011; Ben-Nasr 2016; Lin et al. 2016). 
 
In addition, we find that foreign ownership and fund management companies with 
foreign investors are not only linked to a lower level of funds’ performance but also to 
a lower market share. This finding is consistent with the previous study Chen et al. 
(2016). Further investigation reveals that fund management companies with foreign 
investors have also lower risk level. The result suggests that negative relationship 
between foreign ownership and funds’ performance and market share is contributed by 
foreign shareholders prefer to invest in less risky assets.  
 
We also find that government-controlled companies have a statistically positive 
association with funds’ performance. This is consistent with the findings of Faccio et 
al. (2006), Chahrumiind et al. (2006), Chaney et al. (2011), Ben-Nasr (2016) and Lin 
et al. (2016) but is in contrast to the findings of Chen et al. (2017). However, the 
opposite is true for the relationship between government-controlled fund management 
company and market share. What is more, highly concentrated ownership tends to 
enhance market share. We find an insignificant relationship between concentrated 
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ownership and funds’ performance. This result is supported by previous studies by 
Dong et al. (2014), Nguyen et al. (2015) and Dong et al. (2017) as they report that 
highly concentrated ownership promotes the quality of corporate governance and 
improves monitoring of management. 
 
Furthermore, when we examine the effects of the interaction terms on government 
ownership and foreign ownership, we find that funds’ performance is positively 
associated with government ownership for companies with foreign ownership as well, 
and that there is also a positive relationship between funds’ performance and 
government–controlled companies (GCCs) with foreign ownership. Moreover, we 
discover that the funds’ performance and market share are positively correlated with 
government ownership in the case of highly concentrated ownership. Finally, we 
conclude that foreign ownership has a negative impact on funds’ risk-taking behavior. 
These results are robust under GMM estimations.  
 
Our findings are of importance for policymakers. Moreover, we argue that concentrated 
ownership in a government–controlled company would improve performance and 
increase market share, suggesting that regulators should be cautious about dispersing 
ownership. In addition, although we find that government ownership has a positive 
impact on funds’ performance, an ever-higher level of government ownership will 
reduce its market share, especially in the case of government-controlled companies.  
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Appendix  
Table A1 Definitions of Variables  
Variable Description Sources 
Government 
ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by a government 
agency 
Annual 
reports 
GCCs A dummy variable that equal to 1 if the largest 
(controlling) shareholder is a government agency 
and 0 otherwise 
Annual 
reports 
Foreign ownership The percentage of shares owned by foreign strategic 
investors 
Annual 
reports 
FICs A dummy variable that equal to 1 if a fund 
management company has foreign investment and 0 
otherwise 
Annual 
reports 
OC1 Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 
shareholders of the mutual fund management 
company 
Annual 
reports 
OC2 The percentage of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder 
Annual 
reports 
Expense ratio The fund management company’s expense ratio CSMAR 
Return The fund management company's return CSMAR 
Risk The fund management company's return volatility CSMAR 
Market share The ratio of assets managed by the fund management 
company and all assets managed by the open-end 
mutual fund industry 
CSMAR 
Company Size The log of total net assets managed by the fund 
management company 
CSMAR 
No. of funds started The total number of new funds started by a fund 
management company in a given year 
CSMAR 
Company top1 A dummy variable that equal to 1 if the fund 
management company has at least on fund operating 
in the top 1 of a given category in a given year 
CSMAR 
Company focus Herfindahl index based on investment objective in a 
fund management company 
CSMAR 
Company 
experience 
The number of years for a fund management 
company exists in the industry 
CSMAR 
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Table A2 Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1-Government ownership 1      
2-GCCs 0.76 1     
3-Foreign ownership -0.29 -0.05 1    
4-FICs -0.22 -0.01 0.92 1   
5-OC1 0.09 0.1 0.3 0.28 1  
6-OC2 0.18 0.14 0.1 0.17 0.87 1 
7-Expense -0.15 -0.15 0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 
8-Company size* 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.03 
9-Company age 0.12 0.1 -0.001 0.03 -0.19 -0.19 
10-No. of funds started 0.06 0.05 0.004 0.06 -0.02 0.01 
11-Company top1 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
12-Company focus -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 -0.16 0.05 0.08 
 
(Continued) 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
7-Expenses 1      
8-Company size* -0.22 1     
9-Company age -0.02 0.65 1    
10-No. of funds started -0.23 0.58 0.44 1   
11-Company top1 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 1  
12-Company focus 0.05 -0.59 -0.69 -0.46 -0.04 1 
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients for independent variables from 2005 to 2015. The variable with 
an asterisk (*) is measured in logarithmic; Independent variables with high correlation coefficients are 
marked boldface. 
 
Table A2 presents all the correlation coefficients of the independent variables. We find 
that almost all of the correlation coefficients are below the value of 0.4. This means that 
the independent variables in the regressions are not highly correlated.  
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Table A3. Variables used to analyze the relationship between ownership structure and 
fund performance 
Variables used in similar studies Variables used in this study 
Fund size Fund size 
The size of fund management company The size of fund management company 
Fund age  
Fund management company’s age Fund management company’s age 
Expense ratio Expense ratio 
Management fee  
Return Return 
Abnormal return Abnormal return 
Carhart’s four-factor alpha  
Fama-French three-factor alpha  
Volatility of return (Risk) Volatility of return (Risk) 
Cash flow  
Performance persistence Performance persistence 
Turnover  
Market share Market share 
The number of funds  
 The number of funds started each 
year 
 Fund management company’s focus 
Manager’s tenure  
 Company top1 
 
 
